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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
David Joseph Agatstein -
I. The Establishment Clause
II. Unemployment Insurance
III. St. Martin and Grace Brethren
IV. New York Law
V. Unemployment Insurance and the
Free Exercise of Religion
I
In 1784 the General Assembly of Virginia was asked to
impose an excise tax, known as a tithe, for the support of the
clergy. In its final form, the Assessment Bill provided that each
taxpayer could designate the "society of Christians" to receive his
share of the tax or, if he did not so designate, the taxpayer's share
would be paid into the "public Treasury" to be used "for the encour-
agement of seminaries of learning." -
It3 ppears that the Assessment Bill enjoyed considerable
popularity. - It was, however, defeated, following resolute opposi-
tion by a member of the Assembly, James Madison, who explained his
1/ B.A., J.D., LL.M. The author is an Administrative Law Judge for
the New York State Department of Labor and is Editor-in-Chief of this
Journal. Parts I-IV of this article first appeared in Brooklyn
Barrister, Vol. 41 No. 1, p. 33 (November 1989) and are reprinted
here with permission. The views expressed are entirely those of the
author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Labor Department
or any other agency of government.
I/ Appendix to dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J., in Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947) (hereinafter "Everson").
3/ Everson, 330 U.S. 37.
views on the proper relatipship between government and religion in 5/
his famous Remonstrances, - and later, more succinctly as follows: -
The tendency to a usurpation on one side or the other, or
to a corrupting coalition or alliance between them, will
best be guarded agst. by an entire abstinence of the Govt.
from interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity
of preserving public order, & protecting each sect agst.
trespasses on its legal rights by others ....
Some years later, Madison represented Virginia in the First
Congress. There, with the assistance of his fellow Virginian,
Thomas Jefferson, he proposed and secured ratification of the First
Amendment as the first uticle of the American Bill of Rights. As
Jefferson later wrote: -
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies
solely between man and his God, that he owes account to
none other for his faith or his worship, that the legisla-
tive powers of Government reach actions only, and not
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act
of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"
thus building a wall of separation between church and
State.
Of course, notwithstanding the vividness of Jefferson's
metaphor, there never has been a "wall" of total separation. Madison
himself, in the previously quoted letter, foretold that the wall
would be breached in the interests of "public order." Moreover, the
issues arising under the Religion Clauses have proven far more
complex and intractable than police and fire protection for religious
organizations, or disputed title to church property. Transportation
and other aid to parochial school children; public school prayers,
released time and moments of silence; Sabbath laws and public displays
4/ Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments;
appendix to dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J., in Everson, 330
U.S. 71-72.
5/ Everson, 330 U.S. 40 fn. 28, citing IX Madison 484, 487.
6/ Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, (1948) 333
U.S. 203, 244 fn. 8 (Reed, J., dissenting), citing 8 The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson (Washington Ed., 1861) 113.
)f religious symbols; taxation of ecclesiastical property and tax
axemption of religious contributions; taxation or exemption of church
Lncome; the regulation of practices having religious significance;
and numerous other issues have concerned, and often divided the
Supreme Court, producing results which are difficult, if not impossible,
to reconcile. As Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the court,
acknowledged, "we can only dimly perceive the lines of demar5 gtion in
this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." -
Nevertheless, while the problem of demarcation remains
acute, certain principles relevant to the topic under discussion may
be stated with reasonable certainty. Thus, said thes0upreme Court,
in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, - it is "deci-
sively settled that the First Amendment's mandate that 'Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof' has been made wholly applicable to
the States by the Fosteenth Amendment." Moreover, in Everson v.
Board of Education, - the court declared:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence
a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa.
The Everson court's reference to "all religions" deserves
some emphasis. .Justice Rutledge, dissenting in the same case, stated
that the prohibited "consequence and effect are not removed by
multiplying to all-inclusiveness the sects for which support is
7/ Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1970).
8/ 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).
9/ 330 U.S. 15-16.
exaced."10/exacted." / Moreover, in Schemop, supra, the Supreme Court "rejecte
unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause fL[ids
only governmental preference of one religion over another. 
--
Walzv. Tx Cmmision12/
Walz v. Tax Commission L/ declared that the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection against the evils of "spon-
sorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity." To gy5d against these evils the Supreme
Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, - fashioned a three-pronged test:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .; finally, the
statute must not foster "an excessive governmental entan-
glement with religion."
The "entanglement" prong has been the most difficult fU/
courts to apply. The reason for the rule may be simply stated: -
When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination
in matters of religious significance, the freedom of
religious belief of those who are not adherents of that
denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose
underlying the involvement is largely secular. In addition,
the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is
limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters.
"[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both
religion and government can best work to achieve their
lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its
respective sphere." . .
10/ 330 U.S. 60.
11/ 374 U.S. 216.
12/ 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
13/ 403 U.S. 612.
14/ Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-410 (1985).
Accordingly, AQuilar v. Felton L- reaffirmed that
neither the State nor the Federal Government shall promote
or hinder a particular faith or faith generally through the
advancement of benefits or through the excessive entangle-
ment of church and state in the administration of those
benefits.
These broadly stated principles express well-settled
constitutional doctrine. Determining the precise reach of the
Establishment Clause, however, is an entirely different matter.
II
Constitutional issues of a different nature were before
Congress in 1933 when it first considered an unemployment compensation
bill. "Scarcely anyone then believed that the national government
. . . could itself establish a system of unemployment insurance, so
federal legislation was sought whg would induce the states to enact
unemployment compensation la yl" - The resulting statute, which
became federal law in 1935, - is now codified as Chapter 23 of the
Internal Wenue Code (the "Federal Unemployment Tax Ac/or
"FUTA"), - and Title III of the Socia 0 ecurity Act. - As
Justice Blackman succinctly explained: -
FUTA imposes an excise tax on "wages" paid b an "employer"
in covered "employment," . . as these terms are statutorily
15/ 473 U.S. 414. The "benefits" mentioned in the quote consisted
of the use of federal funds to send teachers and other professionals
into religious schools to provide remedial instruction and other
services.
16/ Edwin E. Witte, "Development of Unemployment Compensation," 55
Yale L.J. 1, 29 (1945); U.S. Const. Amd. X.
17/ 49 Stat. 639.
18/ 26 U.S.C. Section 3301 et seg.
19/ 42 U.S.C. Section 501 et seg.
20/ St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451
U.S. 772, 775 fn. 3 (1980) (hereinafter "St.Martin").
defined. . . . An employer, however, is allowed a credit of
up to 90% of the federal tax for "contributions" paid to a
state fund established under a federally approved state
unemployment compensation law. . . . The requirements for
federal approval are contained in [26 U.S.C.] Sections 3304
and 3309 . . ., and the Secretary of Labor must annually
review and certify the state plan. . . . All 50 States have
employment security laws implementing the federal mandatory
minimum standards of coverage. A State, of course, is free
to expand its coverage beyond the federal minimum without
jeopardizing its federal certification.
The Secretary of Labor has outlined the major objectives of
federal policy,/to which state programs are expected to conform. One
objective is -
[tlo limit the unemployment to be compensated to that due
to lack of work, by requiring claimants to be able to work
and available for suitable work and by temporarily disqual-
ifying claimants who leave work voluntarily without good
cause, who are discharged for misconduct connected with
their work, [or] who refuse suitable work without good
cause,....
It is also federal policy "[tlo cover so far as fei5 ble all workers
subject to the risk of involuntary unemployment." -
Unemployment insurance is intended to benefit, not only
claimants, but, as well, employers and the economy as a whole. The
macroeconomic value of unemployment insurance lies in its role as an
"automatic stabilizer" which, by providing ready cash to large
numbers of people when they are out of 2 rk, tends to counter the
business cycle in times of recession. - Unemployment insurance
aids employers directly by (for example) helping to prevent dispersal
of the employer's work force during periods of temporary economic
21/ Compilation of Materials Implementing Employment Security
Programs Administered by the Department of Labor (N.Y.S. Dep't of
Labor) Section 0, p. 5 (1955) (hereinafter "Compilation").
22/ Id., p. 4.
e_ e, e.g., Richard E. Lester, The Economics of Unemployment
Compensation (Princeton U. 1962), p. 20.
reversal, shutdown and layoff. 24/ Employers who provide unemploy-
ment insurance coverage may have a competitive advantage in recruiting
workers over employers who do not. Whatever the reason, a number of
employers who are not subject to mandatory unemployment insurance
coverage seek such coverage for their employees. This is particularly
true in those situations, shortly to be discussed, where the employer
can avoid part of the cost of participating in the unemployment
insurance program.
FUTA allows the states some leeway with respect to funding.
in New York, contributions are colle~td from employers in the form
of a tax on the employer's payroll. - The rate of tax is usually
determined by the employer's "experience rating," which is based on 26/
the annual cost of benefit claims charged to the employer's account.
Under New York law, contributions must be made entiely by employers,
without any deduction from the employee's wages. -
If the U.S. Secretary of Labor finds that certain conditions
are met, the Secretary is authorized by the Social Security Act to
allocate 100% of the federal tax collected under FUTA to assist the
states !g/the administration of their unemployment insurance pro-
grams. - (Administrative expenses include rents, salaries and the
Like, as opposed to benefit payments.) In New York, legislative
approval is required b re employer contributions may be used to pay
administrative costs. !P
To summarize, it is generally true in New York that unemploy-
ment insurance benefits are paid from employer contributions collected
by the state, while administrative expenses are paid by the federal
government from proceeds of the FUTA excise tax.
24/ Compilation, Section 0, p. 4.
25/ Labor Law Section 570 (McKinney 1988).
26/ Labor Law Section 581 (McKinney 1988).
27/ Labor Law Section 570.6 (McKinney 1988).
28/ 42 U.S.C. Section 501.
29/ Labor Law Section 550.3 (McKinney 1988).
Moinonprofit organizations are exempt from the federal
excise tax. - Internal Revenue Code Section 3301 imposes the tax
"with respect to employment (as defined in Section 3306[c])."
Section 3306(c) (8) excludes from the definition of employment "service
performed in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or
other organization described in Section 501(c) (3) which is exempt
from income tax under Section 501(a)." Thus, Section 501(c) (3)
religious organizations are not required to pay the federal excise
tax which is used to finance unemployment insurance administration.
Nevertheless, since 1970, states have been required to
extend unemployment insurance coverage to certai~lgonprofit organiza-
tions, as a condition of federal certification. 
- The next section
of this article discusses, in some detail, the particular urganiza-
tions subject to this rule. It should be observed, however, thdt the
net effect of the laws just described is to shift the administrative
costs of covering nonprofit organizations to other employers who are
subject to the mandatory FUTA tax. -
In addition, it should be recalled that "(a] state . . . is
free to extend its coverage beyond the feisal minimum without
jeopardizing its federal certification." - If the Secretary of
Labor finds no statutory or constitutional impediment, federal funds
may be used to pay the administrative costs of this extended coverage.
Finally, whoever pays the administrative costs, maintenance of an
unemployment insurance system is itself a valuable service provided
by the government to the participants, employers and claimants alike.
III
From 1960 until 1970 FUTA excluded, from both unemployment
insurance coverage and unemployment insurance taxation, all 501(c) (3)
30/ 26 U.S.C. Section 3301 et seg.
31/ Pub. L. 91-373 Section 104(b) (1), 84 Stat. 697, 26 U.S.C.
Section 3309. The states are also required to permit these organiza-
tions to reimburse the fund for benefits paid, in lieu of making
contributions. 26 U.S.C. Section 3309(a) (2).
32/ See St. Martin, 451 U.S. 776 fn. 6; Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH)
Fed. Paragraph 20,271.
33/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 775 fn. 3.
religious and charitable organizations. 14 In 1970, however,
Section 3306 was amended to require, as a condition of certification,
state coverage of certain previously exempt employers, includi /
nonprofit organizations and institutions of higher education.
At the same time, Section 3309(b) was amended to exclude from required
coverage three categories of employment. The excluded services were
those performed:
(Section 3309(b) (1):] in the employ of (A) a church or
convention or association of churches, or (B) an organization
which is operated primarily for religious purposes and
which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally
supported by a church or convention or association of
churches;
(Section 3309(b) (2):] by a duly ordained, commissioned, or
licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his
ministry or by a member of a religious order in the exercise
of duties required by such order;
[Section 3309(b) (3):] in the employ of a school which is
not an institution of higher education. .
Under this definition, church-run elementary and secondary schools
were mpt from coverage, as they had been exempt under the prior
law.
In 1976, Section 3309(b) (3), supra, was repealed. The
Secretary of Labor announced that repeal was "clearly intended to
result in State coverage of church-related schools, whose employees
constitute3AVer 80 percent of the employees of all nonprofit
schools." - Accordingly, the state of South Dakota, in order to
34/ Pub. L. 86-778 Section 533, 74 Stat. 984. See St. Martin, 451
U.S. 776.
35/ Pub. L. 91-373 Section 104(b) (1), 84 Stat. 697.
36/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 777.
37/ Pub. L. 94-566 Section 114(b) (1), 90 Stat. 2670.
38/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 778.
preserve its federal certification, ended unemployment insurance
coverage to church-related schools.
St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church ("St. Martin") and
Northwestern Lutheran Academy ("Academy") commenced an administrative
proceeding under state law protesting coverage. The Academy and
St. Martin were each members of the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran
Synod and, as such, 4 re exempt from federal income taxation under
Section 501(c) (3). - They contended, among other things, that, by
rendering them liable for unemployment insurance contributions, and
by providing unemployment insurance benefits to their employees,
FUTA, and the corresponding provisions of state law, impermissibly
established religion in South Dakota.
The 4 icts of St. Martin Evanwg3 ical Lutheran Church v.
South Dakota - are straightforward. 
-4 " St. Martin operated an
elementary Christian day school, certified by the state's education
department, and controlled by a Board of Education elected from the
local church congregation. The school was not a separate legal
entity from the church. The Academy was a state-certified four-year
secondary school, controlled by the synod, and not separately incor-
porated. Approximately half of its graduates became ministers of the
church. All courses in both schools were taught from a religious
viewpoint. The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the schools
were covered by the law; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
review.
Justice Blackman, speaking for the court, began his analysis
by observing that a statute should be construed, if 4"airly possible,
to avoid raising doubts of its constitutionality." - Acknowledging
that St. Martin and the Academy were technilly objecting to the
coverage requirement of South Dakota law, - he next undertook a
discussion of FUTA, with which that law was intertwined. He concluded
that, after repeal of Section 3309(b) (3), services rendered to church
39/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 776 fn. 6.
40/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 778.
41/ 451 U.S. 772 (1980).
42/ See St. Martin, 451 U.S. 778-779.
43/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 780.
44/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 780 fn. 9.
schools, such as St. Martin and the Academy, cotignued to be exempt
from coverage under Section 3309(b) (1), supra. - The basis of his
holding that the schools were not corw ations distinct from the
church. - He added, by way of dictum: -
Our holding today concerns only schools that have no legal
identity separate from a church. To establish exemption
from FUTA, a separately incorporated church school (or
other organization) must satisfy the requirements of
Section 3309(b) (1) (B) : that the organization "is operated
primarily for religious purposes," and (2) that it is
"operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported
by a church or convention or association of churches."
By so construing FUTA, Justice Blackman found it unnecessary to reach
the Establishment Clause issue.
48/
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, - the
court's interpretation of the statute must have surprised the members
of Congress who effected repeal of Section 3309(b) (3), as it obviously
confounded the expressed views of the Secretary of Labor. The Senate
and House reports on the repeal bill stated that the purpose was to
remove exemption from coverage under FUTA for all emp yees of
private, nonprofit elementary and secondary schools. - Accordingly,
it may be suggested that the court's disposition of the case reflected
"constitutional doubts" about the extension of unemployment insurance
coverage to employees of religious organizations.
Two other points raised in St. Martin merit discussion.
First, the Supreme Court apparently rejected, without expressly so
stating, a contention that St. Martin and the Academy were operated
primarily for the purpose of "education" rather than for thg 0 urpose
of "religion" within the meaning of Section 3309(b) (1) (B). -
Secondly, the Supreme Court decisively rejected the contention that
45/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 784.
46/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 782-784.
47/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 782 fn. 12.
48/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 788-789.
49/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 789 fn. 1 (quoting the reports).
50/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 779.
the term "church," as used in the conforming South Dakota statute,
referred to a building or "house of worship, 1l s opposed to a reli-
gious body or "organization of worshipers." - The United States,
as amicus curiae, strongly urged the former construction, noting that
the Department of Labor had advanced the ;1)ysical location-place of
worship" theory consistently since 1970. - After considering the 5 3 /
language of the statute itself, the Supreme Court wryly commented: -
The amount of deference due an administrative agency's
interpretation of a statute . . . "will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade, if lacking power to control." . . . Carefully
considering the merits of the Secretary's interpretation,
we believe it does not warrant deference.
The Supreme Court did not mention whether St. Martin or the Academy
were, in fact, physically remote from a place of worship.
The constitutional issues left open in St. Martin were
raised, but not decided, in California v. Grace Brethren Church. -
When it reached the Supreme Court, Grace Brethren involved neither
schools which were part of the corporate structure of a church (which
St. Martin held to be exempt), nor separately incorporated church
schools (which a dictum in St. Martin, quoted above, indicated might
be exempt under certain circumstaggs), but a third category of
schools, namely, those which are -
operated primarily for religious purposes, but which (are]
not operated, supervised, controlled or principally supporte
by a church or convention or association of churches, i.e.,
• . .independent, non-church affiliated religious school(s]
51/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 779, 783.
52/ St. Martin, 451 U.S. 783 fn. 13.
53/ Id.
54/ 457 U.S. 393 (1982) (hereinafter, "GB").
55/ GB, 457 U.S. 399.
The Secretary of Labor found that coverage of these schools
was required by FUTA, and the U.S. District Court agreed. The
District Court concluded, however, that mandatory coverage, as a
condition of certification, violated the Establishment Clause,
because it would lead to excessive entanglement between government
and religion in the determination of unemployment benefi 6 laims.
The District Court reasoned that coverage would involve -
state officials in the resolution of questions of religious
doctrine in the course of determining the benefit eligibility
of discharged employees of religious schools.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court sidestepped the constitu-
tional issue. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the court held that
a declaratory judgment issued by the District Court, which had the
effect of holding the California taxing statute unconstitutional as
applied, violated the Federal Tax Injunction Act, which provides that
district courts "shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain . . . the
collection of any tax under Sta ,law," where an adequate remedy is
available in the state courts. - The Supreme Court reached this
conclusion although the District Court had not, in fact, issued an
injunction prohibiting California from collecting the unemployment 58/
contributions at issue. As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, -
to achieve this result the Supreme Court had to focus on the state
law component of the unemployment insurance program whereas, in
St. Martin, it had treated the coverage provisions as essentially
matters of federal law. In any event, th? 9rajority in Grace Brethren
justified its holding in part by stating -
Carving out a special exception for taxpayers raising first
amendment claims would undermine significantly Congress'
primary purpose "to limit drastically federal district
court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local
concern as the collection of taxes."
Thus, for the second time in two years, the Establishment Clause
issue was left undecided, while access to the district courts for
56/ GB, 457 U.S. 402 fn. 12.
57/ GB, 457 U.S. 407, citing 28 U.S.C. Section 1341.
58/ GB, 457 U.S. 420.
59/ GB, 457 U.S. 416-417.
further consideration of the issue was substantially restricted, if
not foreclosed.
The Establishment Clause arguments considered by the
Grace Brethren District Court will be addressed briefly here. While
Grace Brethren involved various categories of religious schools, the
same issues arise from any state extension of coverage to Sec-
tion 3309(b) (1) or 3309(b) (2) employment, and will be examined in
that broader context. The essential point is that extension of
unemployment insurance coverage to persons performing ecclesiastical
services for religious organizations would not require state officials
to resolve questions of religious doctrine.
Analogous problems arise when persons who work for secular
institutions are fired, or quit, because some requirement of the job
conflicts with a religious belief. In a series of cases discussed in
Part V of this article, the Supreme Court has held that denial of
unemployment insurance benefits to such persons may be prohibited, as
an unconstitutional abridgement of the claimant's freedom of reliion,
guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. --
In these cases, said the Supreme Court, the question presented for
unemployment insurance determination is whether the employee's
beliefs a,/"religious," as opposed to secular, and whether they are
sincere. - This factual inquiry, authorized and required by the
Free Exercise cases, does not involve resolution of disputed issues
of religious doctrine. If the employee performed religious duties
for an ecclesiastical organization, it will be seen upon reflection
that the Free Exercise considerations, and the factual approach
necessary to determine benefit eligibility, would be precisely the
same.
On the other hand, of course, extension of unemployment
insurance coverage to services rendered to religious organizations
would presumably increase the number of inquiries made by state
officials into the sincerity and religious basis of claimants'
behavior. Accordingly, on this ground, it may be argued that coverage
would involve "excessive entanglement" between government and religion
A second point raised by the District Court in Grace Brethrez
involved the contention that extension of coverage to church controlle(
60/ See Part V, infra.
61/ Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,
U.S.L.W. 27462 (U.S. Dec. March 29, 1989); cR U.S. v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965).
or affiliated schools would result in "[ilntrusive monitoring of the
activities" of employees "in order to determine whether or ng/those
employees are exempt from unemployment insurance coverage." - This
problem would be particularly acute if, for example, a state covers
secular employees of religious organizations while exempting those
who perform religious duties for the same organization.
The answer may be that state officials generally rely upon
employers to make the distinction between covered and non-covered
employees. If a dispute arises (in the context of a tax assessment
or benefit claim) the question will be decided in a manner comparable
to that just described: the question is whether the employee performs
duties of a religious nature, a factual issue unrelated to the
validity of anyone's religious belief. However, the District Court's
concern finds support in the observation that state officials may be
more often required to examine the internal structure and practices
of religious organizations.
A more fundamental Establishment Clause objection to
coverage of employees of religious institutions is not expressly
mentioned by the Supreme Court in Grace Brethren. The District Court
was primar concerned with the "entanglement" prong of Lemon v.
Kurtzman. - However, as previously noted, the Establishment Clause
is intended to prohibit "sponsorship, financial supporh4ond active
involvement of the government in religious activity," - and is
violated by laws which do not have a "secular leg 
lative purpose" 65/
or which have the "principal or primary effect" - of advancing or
inhibiting religion. Extension of coverage to those who perform
religious duties for ecclesiastical organizations may have this
proscribed consequence and effect.
62/ GB, 457 U.S. 402 fn. 12.
63/ 403 U.S. 602.
64/ Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
65/ Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1970).
66/ Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). Note
that in Allen (392 U.S. 236, 243-244] "[nlo funds or books [were]
furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit [inured] to
parents and children, not to schools."
New York has taken a "location oriented" approach to
coverage of religious institutions, parallel to the position tradi-
tionally asserted by the U.S. Secretary of Labor. Thus, in 1982,
Labor Law Section 563G /excluded from the definition of employment
services rendered by
(a) a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of
a church in the exercise of his ministry, by a member of a
religious order in the exercise of duties required by such
order,
(b) a lay member elected or appointed to an office within
the discipline of a bona fide church and engaged in reli-
gious functions;
(c) a person employed at a place of religious worship as a
caretaker or for the performance of duties of a religious
nature, or both, unless voluntary election has been made
pursuant to (Section 561].
In 1983, following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
St. Martin, the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme
Court, sustaining an employer's objection to an assessment of unem-
ployment insurance contributions, held that teachers employed at a
nursery school operated by Hollis Hills Jewish Center were "persons
employed at a place of religious worship . . . for the performance of
duties of a religious nature" under Section 563.2(c)6gd, accordingly,
were not covered by the unemployment insurance law. - The court's
opinion did not specify whether the nursery school w separately
incorporated or physically remote from a synagogue. 
- Although the
New York Commissioner of Labor made the assessmen 0 7t issue in
Matter of Hollis Hills Jewish Center v. Roberts, - during the
67/ McKinney 1988.
68/ Matter of Hollis Hills Jewish Center v. Roberts, 92 A.D.2d 1039
(Third Dept. 1983).
69/ However, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board found that
"the facility . . . consists of a main and smaller sanctuary, and
classrooms used for various activities, inluding the nursery school"
(Appeal No. 334,336A).
70/ 92 A.D.2d 1039.
course of the litigation the Commissioner acquiesced to a judicial
finding that the Hollis Hills teachers were not covered. The New York
legislature, however, disagreed. Its response to Hollis Hills was
ingenious, if somewhat defiant.
Section 561 of the New York Labor Law permits employers who
are not subject to mandatory coverage under FUTA to voluntarily elect
coverage. After Hollis Hills was decided, New York amended Sec-
tion 563.2(c), supra, by adding the words "unless voluntary election
has been made pursuant to the provisions of [Section 561]," - and
adding a new 7 ovision, Section 561(c), permitting voluntary election
as follows: -
(c) Services performed at a place of religious worship.
The services of a person performed at a place of religious
worship as a caretaker or for the performance of duties of
a religious nature, or both, shall be deemed employment
within the meaning of this article, if his employer makes
application to this effect and the commissioner approves
such application in writing.
__,7 3Jhe Labor Department memorandum in support of the amendment
states:-
Section 563.2(c) of the Labor Law was originally
written to exclude from unemployment insurance coverage
those individuals who were actively engaged in the perfor-
mance of duties that were of a religious nature. In
Matter of Hollis Hills Jewish Center . . .. the scope of
this section of the law was extended and it was held that
nursery school teachers employed at a place of religious
worship were performing duties of a religious nature.
Under this decision, all teachers who perform services for
religious schools, even those who teach only secular
subjects, are excluded from UI coverage if the school is
located at a place of religious worship. The effect of
this decision is to treat such teachers in a dissimilar
manner from those who are performing precisely the same
teaching services for religious organizations which operate
71/ L. 1986 Ch. 330 Section 2.
72/ L. 1986 Ch. 330 Section 1.
73/ 1986 McKinney's Session Laws of New York 2904.
their schools separate and apart from their place of
worship.
ae s, the Labor Department memorandum continues, the
amendment
permit[s] an employer to elect to cover the services
rendered for a nonprofit organization by a person employed
at a place of religious worship as a caretaker or for the
performance of duties of a religious nature, which are
presently excluded from unemployment insurance coverage.
Who could object to such voluntary coverage?. Not the
employer, who must elect coverage. Not the Commissioner of Labor,
who must consent to the election. Not the employees who are to be
covered by the unemployment insurance program. Perhaps not even the
present writer, although qualms about the issue provided the incentivE
for this article. The U.S. Supreme Court has warned against "too
sweeping utterances on aspects of the [Religion Clauses] that seemed
clear in relation to t particular cases but have limited meaning as
general principles." - Yet, the question remains whether a primary
or principal effect of the New York law is the advancement of religior
Does the statute (including the provisions which shift administrative
costs to profit-ma 'g employers) impermissibly finance, sponsor or
support religion? - The reader may answer these unsettled questions
based upon his or her own perception of the controlling law. The
case will not be argued here. However, this writer agrees with
Elihu Root, who, in 1894, while urging the adoption of an amendment
to the New York constitutio 7 rohibiting the use of public funds for
sectarian education stated - "it is not a question of religion or
creed or party; it is a question of declaring and maintaining the
74/ Id.
75/ Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
76/ An even more compelling question, far outside the scope of this
article, is whether the provisions of federal law which permit
religious orders, whose members are required to take a vow of
poverty, the option of electing coverage under the Social Security
old age, survivors and disability insurance system. See Unemployment
Ins. Rep. (CCH) Fed. Paragraph 10,466C.
77/ Root, Address on Government and Citizenship, 137, 140, quoted
in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 219
(1947) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
great American principle of eternal separation between church and
state."
For more than two hundred years prior to the adoption of
the First Amendment Europe was wracked with periodic warfare, and
religious persecution, associated with the commingling of religion
and politics. The Founding Fathers were thus well aware of the
potential for violence inherent in state sponsorship of religion.
Today, many Americans may be more concerned with promoting religious
liberty abroad, and protecting it at home, than with questions of
religious establishment. And yet, we should remind ourselves that
the establishment of religion by government tends to breed religious
intolerance, and the consequent loss of religious liberty. The
example provided by those nations which vest political authority in
religious zealots demonstrates that the evil which the framers of the
First Amendment sought to avoid still exists in the modern world.
By itself, unemployment insurance coverage of religious
institutions, like the Virginia Assessment Bill /1784, may be of
little significance. However, as Madison said: -
Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment
on our liberties . . . the freemen of America did not wait
till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise and
entangled the question in precedents. They saw all of the
consequences in the principle, and they avoided the conse-
quences by denying the principle. We revere this lesson
too much, soon to forget it.
V
Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church, was dismissed from her employment because she would not work
on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. Unable to find other work
because of her Sabbatarian principles, she applied for unemployment
insurance benefits, which benefits were refused under provisions of a
South Carolina statute which required that claimants be able and
available for work, and that they accept offers of suitable employment.
Upholding the denial of benefits, the South Carolina Supreme Court
rejected her contention that the statute, as applied, abridged
Ms. Sherbert's First and Fourteenth Amendment right to the free
78/ II Madison 183, 185-186, quoted in Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 40
fn. 29 (Rutledge, J. dissenting).
exercise of her religion. The state Supreme Court held that the
statute "places no restriction upon [Ms. Sherbert's] freedom of
religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her
right and freedom to observe her 5igious beliefs in accordance with
the dictates of her conscience." 
- The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed. 8
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion, written by Justice Brennan
begins with an outline of the controlling constitutional principles: 
-
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed
against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as
such . . . [emph. in orig.]. Government may neither compel
affirmation of a repugnant belief... .; nor penalize or
discriminate against individuals or groups because they
hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities ..... ;
nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of
particular religious views. .
On the other hand, the court noted, its precedents allow
governmental regulation of conduct having religious significance for
the actor, if the conduc 2 oses some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order. 2 Since Ms. Sherbert's conscientious
objection to Saturday work involved no such threat, the court reasoned
the denial of benefits could withstand constitutional scrutiny only
if it did not infringe her right to the free exercise of religion, or
if any incidental burden imposed upon such right could be justified
by a compelling state interest in e matter which the state had
constitutional power to regulate. -
The Supreme Court concluded that the denial of benefits to
Ms. Sherbert "clearly" imposed a burden on the free exercise of her
79/ Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963) (hereinafter
"Sherbert").
80/ Sherbert, id.
81/ Sherbert, 374 U.S. 402.
82/ Sherbert, 374 U.S. 403.
83/ Id.
religion, because it required her to foregosAxe of her religious
precepts in order to qualify for benefits:
[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the
observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate
invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally
invalid even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect.
The court then held that South Carolina's expressed desire to avoid
unemployment insurance fraud did not satisfy the "compelling state
interest" test, which could only be met, in this sensitive constitu-
tional area, 8 9 proof of "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests." - South Carolina's fear of depleting the unemployment
insurance fund, or of malingering employees, even if compelling,
would not satisfy the test, said the court, unless the state could
demonstrate that no "alternative form of regulation 8 uld combat such
abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." -
The court7 distinguished, with some difficulty, the Sunday
closing law case, -7 in which it found that the compelling interest
test was satisfied by a state's interest in a "uniform day of rest,"
a factor not present in Sherbert, and observed that Ms. Sherbert's
Saturday observance ds not "serve to make (her] a nonproductive
member of s pety." The court's opinion in Sherbert v. Verner
concluded: -
Our holding today is only that South Carolina may not
constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions [of its
unemployment insurance law] so as to constrain a worker to
abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of
rest.
4/ Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 404, quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 607.
85/ Sherbert, 374 U.S. 406, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530.
86/ Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 407.
87/ Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599.
88/ Sherbert, 374 U.S. 410.
89/ Id.
Asserting that "we are not fostering the 'establishment' of the
Seventh Day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension
of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday
worshipers reflects nothing more than the governmeg6,l obligation of
neutrality in the face of religious differences," - and does not
require excessive entanglement between government and religion
(conclusions which Justice Stewart, concurring in result, vigor Mly
disputed as inconsistent with the Establishment Clause Cases), -
the Supreme Court reverse and remanded. Justices Harlan and White
dissented in Sherbert, - arguing primarily that Ms. Sherbert's
unavailability for work, rather than the reason for such unavailabi-
lity, was the relevant consideration.
In Indiana, a claimant who leaves his job voluntarily is
disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits unless
his unemployment 95sulted from "good cause [arising] in connection
with his work." - Eddie Thomas was employed in a roll foundry,
manufacturing sheet metal. When the foundry closed, he was trans-
ferred to another plant, which manufactured turrets for military
tanks. Thomas concluded that the work conflicted with the pacifist
tenets of his religion. Since no ot work was available, he quit
"due to his religious convictions." The Supreme Court of Indiana
held that he was disqualified 9 om benefits; the U.S. Supreme Court,
applying Sherbert, reversed. -
In so doing, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the court,
discussed the religious beliefs protected by the First Amendment. He
observed that interfaith differences among followers of a particular
creed (here, whether the precepts of the Jehovah's Witnesses permit
or prohibit the manufacture of arms) are not uncommon, and it is not
for courts to resolve these doctrinal questions. - He noted that
90/ Sherbert, 374 U.S. 409.
91/ Sherbert, 374 U.S. 413 fl.
92/ Sherbert, 374 U.S. 418 fl.




96/ Thomas, 101 S.Ct. 1431.
"religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, 9o
comprehensible to others" to merit First Amendment protection, -
and that "(c]ourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs
because the b ever admits he is 'struggling' with his posi-
tion... ... - The Supreme Court would return to these issues in
the later case of Frazee v. Department of Employment Security, infra.
Thomas v. Board of Review reaffirmed the 9 urden on religion"
test adopted in Sherbert. The Thomas court said:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compul-
sion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise
is nonetheless substantial.
With respect to the state interest necessary to justify a
burden on the free exercise of religion, the Thoma0Surt adopted
language from another line of cases and declared: -
The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest.
The court noted, however, that "only those interests of the highest
order can oy~yalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion." -
Seyml terms later, in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission, - the Supreme Court applied the principle of Sherbert
97/ Thomas, 101 S.Ct. 1430.
98/ Id.
99/ Thomas, 101 S.Ct. 1432.
100/ Id.
101/ Thomas, 101 S.Ct. 1432, quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
102/ 107 S.Ct. 1046 (1987).
and Thomas to a religious convert, whose objections to employment
arose, not from any change in her job, but from her adoption of a new
faith (After working in a jewelry store for 2 1/2 years, Paula Hobbie
informed her employer that she was to be baptized into the Seventh Day
Adventist Church and that, for religious reasons, she would no longer
be available to work on Saturdays. The denial of unemployment
insurance benefits which followedl reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court.). The Hobbie court said:
Both Sherbert and Thomas held that such infringements
[i.e., the indirect burden upon free exercise of religion
resulting from the denial of unemployment insurance benefits]
must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified
only by proof by the State of a compelling interest.
The U.S. Supreme Court thereupon declined to relax the "strict
scrutiny-compelling state interest" test or otherwise to modify or
distinguish Sherbert v. Verner.
t W recently, in Frazee v. Department of Employment
Security, the state of Illinois rejected the unemployment
insurance claim of an unaffiliated "Christian" who refused to accept
a temporary job working on Sundays. Noting that not every Christian
sect prohibits Sunday labor, the state court adopted a rule authorizing
the denial of benefits unless the refusal to work is based upon the
tenets or dogma of some church, sect or denomination to which the
claimant belonged. Relying upon its holding in Thomas v. Board of
Review (that disputed or unsettled dogma qualifies for First Amend-
ment protection) a unanimous Supreme Court reversed.
In so doing, the court found two elements necessary for
invocation of the Free Exercise Clause. The first requirement is
that the refusal to work be based upon religious, rather than secular
considerations. The court recognized that some fiefs may be "so
bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation" - as not to
qualify for Free Exercise protection, but found that Frazee's refusal,
as a Christian, to work on Sunday was religious, and was acknowledged
by Illinois to be such.
103/ 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1049.
104/ U.S.L.W. 27462 (U.S. Dec. March 29, 1989).
105/ Frazee v. Department of Employment Security, id., fn. 2,
quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, 715.
The second element authorized by the Supreme Court is a
requirement that the claimant's religious belief be sincerely held
Frazee's sincerity was conceded by Illinois). With resyW to the
sincerity test, the Supreme Court cited U.S. v. Seeger, which
interpreted a federal statute as granting an exemption from compulsory
military service to conscientious objectors whose religious views
were personally evolved, and unique to themselves, rather than having
been promulgated by an organized religion. In that case, the Supreme
Court observed that it was proper for administrative agencies to
examine the sincerity, but not the truth or validity, of an individual's
professed religious belief.
As it had in prior cases, the Supreme Court in Frazee found
a lack of evidence that granting unemployment insurance benefits to
Sunday worshipers would create widespread unemployment, or even
seriously affect unemployment. Accordingly, it found that the
"compelling state interest test" had not been met, and reversed the
judgment of the Illinois court.
Thomas v. Board of Review involved religious objection to a
particular type of work (armament production), while the other cases
discussed in this section all concerned Sabbath observance. Other
forms of religious expression in the workplace (the wearing of
religious garb or emblems, proselytizing coworkers or customers,
etc.) have not been addressed by the Supreme Court in the context of
unemployment insurance, and, accordingly, are beyond the scope of
this survey. It will be noted that the four unemployment insurance
cases invoking the Free Exercise Clause all involved denial of
benefits (discharge, quitting, availability for work and refusal of
employment). By contrast, the Establishment Clause, with which this
article is principally concerned, is usually invoked in the context
of unemployment insurance coverage. Finally, while the Supreme Court
has recognized a "tension" betwe B7 he Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses as presently construed, - resolution of that tension will
not be attempted here.
106/ 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
107/ Rehnquest, J., dissenting in Thomas, 101 S.Ct. 1433; See also
Vander Laan v. Mulder, 443 N.W.2d 491 (Mich. App. 1989).
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KANSAS CITY WELCOMES NAALJ
OCTOBER 17-20, 1990
Convention headquarters for the 1990 NAALJ Convention and
Seminar is the Plaza Hilton Hotel located in the beautiful plaza area
of Kansas City, Missouri. Members from Missouri (home of Frank
Wallemann, Convention Chairman), Kansas (home of the NAALJ 1989-90
President Barbara Lundin Kovarovic) and Iowa are combining efforts to
make the convention and seminar the best ever. In addition to being
an academically strong meeting, the location promises broad
opportunities for cultural enrichment.
The Kansas City Area, centering on Missouri's western
metropolis and Kansas' eastern metropolis, is ideal for vacationers
who don't like to spend a lot of time going from one attraction to
the next. In this compact area, travelers enjoy history, urban fun
and scenery.
First time visitors often are surprised by Kansas City's beauty.
Rolling hills, tree-lined boulevards, parks and fountains provide a
visual treat.
Swope Park highlights the city's "green space".
visitors have enjoyed what ranks as one of America's
parks (more that 1,700 acres). You'll enjoy the zoo,
and golf courses -- including what may be Missouri's
golf (folf) course.
In all, the metro area offers 25 lakes in parks
There's a lake and rose garden at 75-acre Loose Park.
Lake Jacomo, in Fleming Park, is an area favorite.
















ringed with lakes -- for example,
And two new lakes, Longview and Blue
east.
For many travelers, a big city
nightlife. If that's your pleasure,
Overland Park. For starters, there's
fromm the city's early days have been
restaurants and nightspots.
means shopping, dining and
you'll love Kansas City and
historic Westport. Buildings
transformed into boutiques,
Nearby is the famed County Club Plaza -- 14 square blocks,
developed in the 1920s as America's first shopping center. The
elegant area offers fountains and Moorish architecture, along with
more that 150 shops and 30 restaurants.
Want more? There's 85-acre Crown Center, virtually a city
within a city. Or the new AT&T Town Pavilion, downtown. There's th
colorful City Market, dating to the 1840s. And there are regiona
shopping malls throughout the metro area.
Perhaps history and museums are what you expect when you visit
major city. If so, stop by the 216-foot Liberty Memorial (it'
practically across the street from Crown Center). You can ride t,
the top or tour the Memorial's World War I museum.
The city's premier museum, of course, is the Nelson-Atkin
Museum -- one of America's top art museums. Also, don't miss th(
Kansas City Museum, the Miniature Museum or the pre-Civil War Wornal"
House, among other museum experiences.
If pro sports action makes you cheer, come see the baseball
Royals and football Chiefs at the Truman Sports Complex. At Kempet
Arena, you'll get a kick out the the Comets, the city's entry in thE
Major Indoor Soccer League.
When you are luckey enough to be there in the summer months,
then head for Worlds of Fun. You'll enjoy more than 115 rides and
shows at the family fun park. And you can cool off at nearby Oceans
of Fun -- the Midwest's largest tropically-themed water park.
But wait... there's more! There's music, from jazz to the
Symphony to the Lyric Opera. There's Old West fun and horseback
riding at Benjamin Stables. There are dinner theaters (Tiffany's
Attic Waldo Astoria), river excursions (on the Missouri River
Queen$, and a year full of concerts and festivals.
And there are side trips. Don't forget that the Kansas City
Area is much more than just Kansas City.
North along the Missouri River is Weston, with more than 100
buildings pre-dating the Civil War. Visit the Weston Historical
Museum or tour the family-run McCormick Distillery. When the snow
flies, try skiing at Snow Creek.
Kansas City's best-known suburb is Missouri's fourth-largest
city, Independence. Once a major stop on the old frontier trails,
it's more famed today as the home of Harry Truman. Visit the Truman
Library and Museum, with fascinating exhibits on the presidency. Go
by Mr. Truman's home and his restored office at the county
courthouse (you'll want a photo of the Truman statue outside).
For a look at earlier history, walk through the 1859 Jail,
Marshal's Home and Museum. Or stop by the Mormon Visitors Center to
learn why Independence holds special significance for their church.
And at the auditorium, world headquarterrs of the Reorganized Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, you'll see a museum and
gallery.
Travel north to Liberty to visit the jail where Mormon prophet
Joseph Smith was confined in 1838-39. Also here is the Jesse James
Bank Museum, site of America's first daylight bank robbery. And at
Kearney, you can see the home where Jesse James grew up (and his
gravesite).
Nearby is Excelsior Springs, once a world-famed health spa. You
can sample the mineral water or tour the city's historical museum.
And just north, the Watkins Mill State Historic Site has preserved
an 1860s woolen mill.
Head east from Kansas City for a look at Fort Osage,
reconstructed on the Missouri River, where William Clark built
America's first outpost in the Louisiana Territory. Farther east is
Lexington, site of a major Civil War battle. You'll enjoy the town's
historical museum and browsing through its antique shops.
On the region's western edge is the State of Kansas. Overland
Park, Kansas is one of the fastest growing cities in the United
States with one of the highest per capita incomes in the country.
There are lots of mall, restaurants and shopping areas to please
every visitor.
On the region's southern edge is Grandview, where young Harry
Truman's farm home can be toured. Other historic towns are here --
Harrisonville, Belton and others -- along with open country for
outdoor fun.
Scenery ... history ... urban excitement -- no wonder the
Kansas City Area is a family favorite.
Delta Airlines has agreed to provide to be our official carrier
with discounted airfares and a frequent flier bonus.
All inquiries concerning the convention will go to the
convention chairman, Frank Wallemann:
National Association of Administrative Law Judges
Convention 1990
P.O. Box 104992
Jefferson City, MO 65110-4992
All members of NAALJ will receive a discount on the cost of the
convention and seminar and will receive hotel information and an
application, mailed by the National Center for State Courts, during
the summer of 1990. Watch for it. Register early!
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